landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for filesystem

This cosmetic change is needed for audit support, specifically to be
able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.

Add landlock_get_applicable_subject(), mainly a copy of
landlock_get_applicable_domain(), which will fully replace it in a
following commit.

Optimize current_check_access_path() to only handle the access request.

Partially replace get_current_fs_domain() with explicit calls to
landlock_get_applicable_subject().  The remaining ones will follow with
more changes.

Remove explicit domain->num_layers check which is now part of the
landlock_get_applicable_subject() call.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This commit is contained in:
Mickaël Salaün 2025-03-20 20:06:53 +01:00
parent 5b95b329be
commit ae2483a260
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2 changed files with 92 additions and 30 deletions

View File

@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* Landlock LSM - Credential hooks
* Landlock - Credential hooks
*
* Copyright © 2019-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
* Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation
*/
#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H
@ -13,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include "access.h"
#include "ruleset.h"
#include "setup.h"
@ -53,6 +55,55 @@ static inline bool landlocked(const struct task_struct *const task)
return has_dom;
}
/**
* landlock_get_applicable_subject - Return the subject's Landlock credential
* if its enforced domain applies to (i.e.
* handles) at least one of the access rights
* specified in @masks
*
* @cred: credential
* @masks: access masks
* @handle_layer: returned youngest layer handling a subset of @masks. Not set
* if the function returns NULL.
*
* Returns: landlock_cred(@cred) if any access rights specified in @masks is
* handled, or NULL otherwise.
*/
static inline const struct landlock_cred_security *
landlock_get_applicable_subject(const struct cred *const cred,
const struct access_masks masks,
size_t *const handle_layer)
{
const union access_masks_all masks_all = {
.masks = masks,
};
const struct landlock_ruleset *domain;
ssize_t layer_level;
if (!cred)
return NULL;
domain = landlock_cred(cred)->domain;
if (!domain)
return NULL;
for (layer_level = domain->num_layers - 1; layer_level >= 0;
layer_level--) {
union access_masks_all layer = {
.masks = domain->access_masks[layer_level],
};
if (layer.all & masks_all.all) {
if (handle_layer)
*handle_layer = layer_level;
return landlock_cred(cred);
}
}
return NULL;
}
__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void);
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H */

View File

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks
* Landlock - Filesystem management and hooks
*
* Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
* Copyright © 2021-2022 Microsoft Corporation
* Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation
* Copyright © 2022 Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
* Copyright © 2023-2024 Google LLC
*/
@ -773,11 +773,14 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
if (!access_request_parent1 && !access_request_parent2)
return true;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path))
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!path))
return true;
if (is_nouser_or_private(path->dentry))
return true;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1 || !layer_masks_parent1))
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!layer_masks_parent1))
return false;
allowed_parent1 = is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks_parent1);
@ -928,16 +931,21 @@ jump_up:
static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
access_mask_t access_request)
{
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
const struct access_masks masks = {
.fs = access_request,
};
const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), masks, NULL);
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
if (!dom)
if (!subject)
return 0;
access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(dom, path, access_request, &layer_masks,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
access_request, &layer_masks,
LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, path, access_request,
&layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@ -1100,7 +1108,8 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
struct dentry *const new_dentry,
const bool removable, const bool exchange)
{
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs, NULL);
bool allow_parent1, allow_parent2;
access_mask_t access_request_parent1, access_request_parent2;
struct path mnt_dir;
@ -1108,10 +1117,9 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
layer_mask_t layer_masks_parent1[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {},
layer_masks_parent2[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
if (!dom)
if (!subject)
return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
return -EACCES;
if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
return -ENOENT;
if (exchange) {
@ -1136,10 +1144,11 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
* for same-directory referer (i.e. no reparenting).
*/
access_request_parent1 = landlock_init_layer_masks(
dom, access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2,
subject->domain,
access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2,
&layer_masks_parent1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
dom, new_dir, access_request_parent1,
subject->domain, new_dir, access_request_parent1,
&layer_masks_parent1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@ -1162,10 +1171,12 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
old_dentry->d_parent;
/* new_dir->dentry is equal to new_dentry->d_parent */
allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(dom, mnt_dir.dentry, old_parent,
allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(subject->domain, mnt_dir.dentry,
old_parent,
&layer_masks_parent1);
allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses(
dom, mnt_dir.dentry, new_dir->dentry, &layer_masks_parent2);
allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses(subject->domain, mnt_dir.dentry,
new_dir->dentry,
&layer_masks_parent2);
if (allow_parent1 && allow_parent2)
return 0;
@ -1177,9 +1188,9 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
* destination parent access rights.
*/
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
dom, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1, &layer_masks_parent1,
old_dentry, access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent2,
exchange ? new_dentry : NULL))
subject->domain, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1,
&layer_masks_parent1, old_dentry, access_request_parent2,
&layer_masks_parent2, exchange ? new_dentry : NULL))
return 0;
/*
@ -1506,11 +1517,10 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access,
optional_access;
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
landlock_get_applicable_domain(
landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain, any_fs);
const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
landlock_get_applicable_subject(file->f_cred, any_fs, NULL);
if (!dom)
if (!subject)
return 0;
/*
@ -1531,9 +1541,10 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
dom, &file->f_path,
landlock_init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request,
&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
subject->domain, &file->f_path,
landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
full_access_request, &layer_masks,
LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
&layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
allowed_access = full_access_request;
} else {